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Abstract
Combinations of various policy instruments to deal with the threat of cli-
mate change are used throughout the world. The aim of this article is
to investigate an electricity market with two di¤erent policy instruments,
Tradable Green Certicates (TGCs) and CO2 emission allowances (an
Emission Trading System, ETS). We analyze both the short- and long-
run e¤ects of a domestic market and a market with trade. We nd that
increasing the TGC quota obligation will decrease the electricity produced
using non-renewable sources as well as the long-run total production of
electricity. For the electricity produced using renewable energy sources,
an increase in the quota obligation leads to increased production in al-
most all cases, with assumptions based on historical data. The impacts of
the ETS price on the electricity production are negative for all electricity
production, which is surprising. This means that the combination of ETS
and TGCs gives unexpected and unwanted results for the electricity pro-
duction using renewable sources, since an increase in the ETS price leads
to a decrease in this production.
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1 Introduction
Growing concerns about climate change have led to a variety of mechanisms
for promoting electricity from renewable energy sources. A number of di¤erent
policy instruments are used throughout the world, and as the global climate ne-
gotiations slowly move forward, this situation will continue. Policy instruments
to support electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) can be designed to
directly increase RES-E production or to indirectly promote RES-E as a substi-
tute for fossil fuel-based production (i.e. to reduce carbon emissions). Examples
of the latter are the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), active across ten U.S. states, and
a CO2 tax. Examples of policies directly promoting RES-E are feed-in tari¤s
(FiTs) and tradable green certicates (TGCs). Numerous countries have com-
binations of policy instruments that a¤ect the electricity production, directly
and indirectly. On top of this, some policy instruments are domestic and oth-
ers are traded internationally. In Sweden, the electricity market is deregulated
since 1996 and the trade in electricity takes place at Nord Pool, the market-
place for trades in electricity for Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark.1 The
EU ETS started in 2005,2 as an extension to the Kyoto agreement, with the
objective to reduce CO2 emissions at the lowest possible cost. At present, the
EU ETS consists of 30 European countries, including Sweden and Norway. In
May 2003 the market for TGCs started in Sweden and it will be extended to
include Norway in 2012. The objective of the TGC market is to increase the
percentage of the total electricity production that relies on renewable energy
sources, so-called green electricity. Electricity consumers are obliged to possess
a number of TGCs in relation to their total electricity consumption, determined
by the quota obligation set by the Swedish Government. The producers that use
renewable energy sources are allocated TGCs, representing the supply of TGCs.
In Sweden, the type of energy plants that entitles TGCs are wind power, so-
lar, wave and geothermal energy as well as bio-fuels, peat3 and hydropower4 .
These two policy instruments coexist in the Swedish and Norwegian electricity
markets, where the TGC system is designed to increase the part of the total
generated electricity that comes from renewable energy sources, whereas the
ETS is designed to decrease CO2 emissions.
Some recent research has focused on these di¤erent policy instruments, but with
less attention to how well the supporting policies work together or whether they
may work at cross purposes. Fischer and Preonas (2010) review the recent en-
vironmental economics literature on the e¤ectiveness of RES-E policies and on
interactions between them. Special attention is given to Fischer (2009), that
demonstrates how the relative slopes of supply and demand curves determine
the price incidence of portfolio standards, showing that assumptions about re-
newable energy sources are more important than those about non-renewable
supplies. Early contributions to the area include Morthorst (2001) and Jensen
and Skytte (2002). Morthorst analyzes the pricing mechanism of a TGC system
1Not all countries have been part of the market since 1996. Norway was the rst member
(since 1993), and then Finland joined in late 1997, western Denmark in July 1999 and eastern
Denmark joined in October 2000.
2The rst three years, 2005-2007, it was a trial period called Phase I.
3When burnt in combined heat and power production (CHP) plants.
4With restrictions in capacity.
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and an ETS in relation to the value of the emissions reductions, while Jensen
and Skytte nd that a combination of a TGC system and an ETS results in a
lower consumer price. Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010) show that introducing
a policy instrument that promotes electricity from renewable energy sources, in
a market under autarky, leads to production increases in the dirtiest technology
using non-renewable energy sources. Unger and Ahlgren (2005) show that most
TGC markets will favor cheap renewable technologies before expensive ones.
This will not promote the inventions and development of new renewable tech-
nologies. In line with Unger and Ahlgren, Bergek and Jacobsson (2010) and
Jacobsson et al. (2009) criticize the TGC system due to the ine¤ectiveness in
driving technical change. Bye (2003) models a TGC market and Bye and Bru-
voll (2008) extend his model to include other subsidies and taxes, yet neither of
these studies takes the ETS market into account. Rathmann (2007) shows that
German electricity prices are reduced due to an RES-E system implemented in
the German electricity market with EU ETS, for the period 2005-2007. Amund-
sen and Nese (2009) investigate the analytics of a TGC system and nd that
the TGC system may be an imprecise instrument to regulate the generation
of green electricity, and that combining TGC with ETS may yield outcomes
contrary to the intended purpose. Even though our model is inspired by the
model in Amundsen and Nese, the settings in the models di¤er, especially as
regards how the ETS is treated. Our study gives more structure to the model
and analyses short- and long-run e¤ects. The earlier study by Amundsen and
Mortensen (2001) preceding Amundsen and Nese investigates the relationship
between the TGC and ETS markets by focusing on the Danish market. Thus,
they assume a given capacity in the green electricity production, since in Den-
mark all green electricity production is wind power. Amundsen et al. (2006) use
an intertemporal simulation model that allows for banking, and conclude that
banking reduces the price of green certicates. Pethig and Wittlich (2009) nd
that if a country targets both emissions and renewable targets, mixed policies
are preferred, provided that both policy instruments are binding, while Abrell
and Wiegt (2008) nd that with ETS and TGC or feed-in tari¤s (FiTs), the
price of carbon drops to zero due to the existing high share of CO2-neutral
renewable generation.
The above discussion on previous literature shows the great variety in the pre-
vious research. Moreover, the qualitative model results are to a large extent
undetermined. We believe that the complexity of the policies is one reason for
this. Thus to remove some of the question marks and obtain more clear results,
it seems necessary to introduce stronger, but reasonable, assumptions imposing
more structure on the TGC market models. Our study will analyze a country
with an existing well-functioning electricity market with an emission trading
system (ETS) and a TGC market. We will cover both a domestic TGC system
and an extended TGC system with trade, both with a short-run and a long-run
perspective. The distinction between short run and long run is of great impor-
tance since this makes it possible to introduce stronger assumptions about the
shape of the marginal cost functions. The focus will be on the TGC market
and its impact on the production using renewable versus the production using
non-renewable energy sources. We will set up a model and perform an analytical
discussion on the electricity production and the impacts of a TGC quota and the
ETS price, distinguishing between short- and long-run e¤ects. The simplifying
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but reasonable assumptions we make is that in the short run marginal cost in
renewable electricity production is constant and zero (due to hydro and wind
power), while in the long run the marginal cost in black electricity production
is constant because of long-run constant returns to scale. We will also look
into the empirical data, where needed. We believe that the short-run/long-run
distinction is the key to obtain distinct results. Although we observe no di¤er-
ences for the time horizons in the actual results, it should be remembered that
the underlying assumptions are di¤erent between the short- and the long-run.
The paper is organized as follows. We will start with a model description and
the general results in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the short-run assumptions
used and presents the results for the short run analysis, and Section 4 does the
same for the long run analysis. In Section 5 we take a closer look at the Nordic
electricity market, and Section 6 discusses an extended TGC market. Section 7
concludes the paper, with the results and a discussion.
2 The general model
We will formulate a static model of an electricity market. We have two types
of producers; black electricity producers, using non-renewable energy sources,
and green electricity producers, using renewable energy sources. The following
labels and functions will be used in the model:
Labels and functional relationships
yb black electricity, produced using non-renewable sources
yg green electricity, produced using renewable sources
y total production of electricity, y = yb + yg
p(y) price of electricity, with @p@y < 0
ptgc price of green certicates
pets price of emission allowances
 quota obligation for green certicates, as a percentage of total electricity
 CO2 emission density
ci(yi) cost function for black/green electricity production
with @ci@yi > 0 and
@2ci
@y2i
 0; for i = b; g
The number of TGCs is measured in the same unit as the amount of green elec-
tricity. The demand for TGCs is given by y, since all producers are obliged
to hold a number of TGCs equal to  times their production5 . The supply is
given by yg, since this is the number of TGCs available in the market. This
gives yg = y: There will be producers that do not qualify as green electricity
producers but have no CO2 emissions; this is not a problem since they will be
classied as black electricity producers with  set to zero.6 The model origi-
nates in the prot maximization problem for the producers. The maximization
problem for the producer of black electricity is
max pyb   cb(yb)  ptgcyb   petsyb;
5 In this model we assign the obligation to hold TGCs to the producers of electricity,
while in reality the obligation is assigned to the suppliers/consumers of electricity. However,
theoretically this does not make a di¤erence and does not restrict the model.
6Unfortunally it is, in this setting, not possible to treat these producers separately.
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giving the rst-order conditions for an optimum
p =
@cb
@yb
+ ptgc + pets: (1)
The maximization problem for the producer of green electricity is
max pyg   cg(yg) + (1  ) ptgcyg
and the rst-order conditions for an optimum is
p =
@cg
@yg
  (1  ) ptgc: (2)
Solving equation (2) for ptgc and inserting the expression for ptgc in equation
(1) gives
p = (1  ) @cb
@yb
+ 
@cg
@yg
+ (1  ) pets: (3)
Impacts of the quota obligation
Implicitly di¤erentiating equation (3) with respect to , and using that y =
yb + yg and yg = y; we get the impacts of the quota obligations on yb, yg and
y:7
@yb
@
=
1
1 yb


@2cg
@y2g
  @p@y

+

@cg
@yg
  p

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
< 0; (4)
@yg
@
=
1
ayg
@p
@y   (1 )a yg @
2cb
@y2b
+ a1 

@cg
@yg
  p

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
; (5)
@y
@
=
ay
@2cg
@y2g
  y (1  ) @2cb
@y2b
+ 1(1 )

@cg
@yg
  p

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
: (6)
When looking at the impacts of the quota obligation, we see that the denom-
inator is the same and negative for the impacts on both types of electricity
production and the total production. The impact of the quota obligation on
the black electricity is negative, since all included terms in the numerator are
positive. This means that if the quota obligation, , increases, then the pro-
duction of black electricity decreases. The numerators are undetermined for
green electricity and total consumption, so we need to take a closer look at the
included terms, and in the following sections we study the two di¤erent time
preferences, i.e. the short- and long-run aspects. But rst we use the general
model to reveal the impacts of the ETS price.
7The calculations are available on request
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Impacts of the ETS price
Moving on to study the impact of the ETS price on electricity production, we
take the implicit derivative with respect to pets in equation (3) and get the
impacts of the price of ETS on yb, yg and y:
@yb
@pets
=
(1  )2

 + pets
@
@pets

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
; (7)
@yg
@pets
=
 (1  )

 + pets
@
@pets

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
; (8)
@y
@pets
=
(1  )

 + pets
@
@pets

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
: (9)
We see that the signs of the impacts on the black, green and total production
will always be the same and depend on the magnitude of  (the CO2 emission
density) in relation to the sign and magnitude of pets
@
@pets
. We need to study
the included terms in more detail, in the short- and long-run analyses, but let
us rst summarize the results for the general model in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the results
for the general model.
General
model
@yb
@ -
@yg
@ ?
@y
@ ?
@yb
@pets
?
@yg
@pets
?
@y
@pets
?
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The number of question marks in Table 1 illustrates the need for stronger as-
sumptions to obtain clear results. The next section will discuss the assumptions
for the short run and present the impacts of the quota obligation and the price
of the ETS on electricity production. However, interesting conclusions can still
be drawn at this stage. First, the only clear impact of the quota obligation is
on the production of black electricity. This is a bit surprising since the purpose
of the TGC system is to promote green electricity and not to decrease black
electricity production, even if this is an expected outcome. Further we see that
the impact of the ETS price will have the same sign for both types of electricity
production and for the total electricity production, which is also a bit surpris-
ing. One might expect that the sign of the impacts on the production of green
electricity and on the production of black electricity to di¤er. We will try to
straighten out all question marks in Table 1, starting with the analysis of the
short run. In the following we will make assumptions based on the Nordic mar-
ket situation, however we believe that the assumptions are reasonable in other
markets as well.
3 The model in the short run
In the short run we will assume that the marginal cost of green electricity
production is constant, since the short run changes are made in existing hydro
and wind power plants. Hence @
2cg
@y2g
= 0. The cost function for black electricity,
cb; can be expressed as cb = yb, where b  1:2.8 Further, we assume that the
demand for electricity can be written y = Dp, and hence y @p@y =
1
p; where 
is the price elasticity of demand for electricity. A price elasticity of -0.1 is used
in both Bye (2003) for the Norwegian electricity market and De Jonhe et al.
(2009) for the Benelux, France and Germany markets. Johnsen et al. (2000)
presents a table of price elasticities for residential electricity demand, ranging
from -0.19 to -0.76, based on empirical studies across the world. They nd that,
in Norway, the price elasticity can be estimated to -0.1 to -0.2. Based on this
previous research, for the short run, we assume that 0:1 < jj < 0:3:
Impacts of the quota obligation
Using some of the assumptions described above, equation (5) can be rewritten
as
@yg
@
=
1
p  (1  ) y @
2cb
@y2b
+ ptgc
@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
: (10)
The denominator is still negative and for the numerator we have 1p (1  ) y @
2cb
@y2b
<
0 and ptgc > 0: Thus if
 1p  (1  ) y @2cb@y2b  > ptgc; we have that @yg@ > 0.
To simplify the analysis we use
 1p  (1  ) y @2cb@y2b  >  1p ; and it is therefore
enough to show that
 1p > ptgc to state that @yg@ > 0: The restriction for ;
8This assumption relates to the principal merit order curve in Swedish electricity produc-
tion. See for instance www.svenskenergi.se
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i.e. 0:1 < jj < 0:3; is equal to 10 >
 1  > 3 13 . Since by denition 0 <  < 1,
we have that
 1  > :9 Therefore, to be able to show that the impact of the
quota obligation is positive, it is enough to show that p > ptgc: We believe that
p > ptgc most of the time, yet we are unable to state this for certain. Hence,
we are not able to determine the sign of the impact of the quota obligation on
the green electricity production, since we need either
 1p > ptgc or p > ptgc.
However, to gain more insight into this matter, we study this case in Section 5,
Visiting the Nordic Electricity market.
Rewriting the derivative for the total electricity, i.e. equation (6), using the
short-run assumptions gives
@y
@
=
 y (1  ) @2cb
@y2b
+ ptgc
@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
=
  (1  )b 1 b(b  1)Db 1p(b 1) + ptgc
@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
: (11)
Here we have the negative term  (1  )b 1 b(b 1)Db 1p(b 1) and the positive
term ptgc: We see that the sign of
@y
@ will depend both on the assumptions
for the short run, i.e. b; D and ; and on the prices of electricity and TGCs.
We know that 0:1 < jj < 0:3; b  1:2 and y = Dp (and therefore D = yp ):
Unfortunately, we are unable to determine the sign of the impacts on the total
electricity production since we need to know the relationship between ptgc, p
and y. This relationship will be analyzed Section 5.
Impacts of the ETS price
In the short run we assume that @@pets = 0 since the producers have no possibility
to react to a change in the ETS price by changing their CO2 emission density.
The equations (7), (8) and (9) can now be rewritten as
@yb
@pets
=
(1  )2 
@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
< 0; (12)
@yg
@pets
=
 (1  ) 
@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
< 0; (13)
@y
@pets
=
(1  ) 
@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
< 0: (14)
The impact on all types of electricity production is negative, meaning that an
increase in the price of the emission allowances gives rise to a decrease in the
9Actually, it is possible to put a harder restriction on  since the quota obligation for the
green certicates ranges (for Sweden) from 0:1 to 0:2 from 2011 to 2028. After 2028, the
quotas will decrease and go down to 0,008 in 2035, which is, at this point, the last year for
the TGC system in Sweden. However, at this stage of the analysis we do not need a harder
restriction than 0 <  < 1:
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electricity production. As stated before, the signs are the same for all types
of production and noteworthy, there is a negative impact of the price of the
emission allowances on the green electricity production. This is not an expected
result and shows that the combination of the ETS and TGC markets appears to
work contradictorily with respect to the production of electricity using renewable
sources. Increasing the price of the emission allowances works restrictively on
the black electricity production (in line with the aim of the ETS), but also on
the green electricity production. Further we see that the impact is larger on the
black electricity production than on the green electricity production.10 In the
next section we will study the long run impacts.
4 The model in the long run
In this section we move the focus to a long-run static equilibrium. We do
not take investments or other capacity changes into account. Further, the cost
functions in the long run are not the same as the cost functions in the short
run, yet for simplicity, we have the same notations as in the short run. In the
long run, we assume that the marginal cost of the black electricity is constant,
so @
2cb
@y2b
= 0; due to long-run constant returns to scale. Further, we still assume
that the demand for electricity can be written y = Dp; but with  less than
 0:3:
Impacts of the quota obligation
Using these assumptions, equation (5) can be rewritten as
@yg
@
=
1
p+ ptgc
@p
@y   2 @
2cg
@y2g
: (15)
Again we need a more careful study of the included terms. We study the nu-
merator of @yg@ ; where
1
p < 0 and ptgc > 0. Either we stop here and say
that if
 1p > ptgc we have a positive impact of the quota obligation on the
green electricity production or we try to split up the terms. We know that
jj > 0:3 and to get
 1  >  we need to put a restriction on : If we assume
that  < 0:5 then jj < 2.11 Following the discussion for the short run we
therefore either need
 1p > ptgc or p > ptgc to state that the impact on the
green electricity production is positive: Again we cannot determine the sign of
the impact of the quota obligation on the green electricity production without
further assumptions on p and ptgc (see Section 5). For total electricity we have
10As long as  is smaller than 0.5.
11 jj = 2 ,
 1  = 0:5: As mentioned ealier, an  < 0:5 is a reasonable assumption. In
Sweden  ranges from 0:1 and 0:2 from 2011 to 2028. An upper limit of jj = 2 is reasonable
and we do not believe that the long-term price elasticity of electricity will be nearly as high
as 2. See for instance Dahl (1993) for a literature review on price elasticities.
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@y
@
=
y
@2cg
@y2g
+ ptgc
@p
@y   2 @
2cg
@y2g
< 0; (16)
since the numerator is positive, meaning that an increased quota obligation gives
rise to a decrease in the total electricity production. This is an expected result
and together with the negative impact on the black electricity production we can
state that the impact on the green electricity production has to be larger than
the impact on the black electricity production (@yg@ >
@yb
@ ). This can be fullled
with @yg@ > 0 or
@yg
@ < 0; but in the latter case we also need
@yg@  < @yb@  :
The expected result would of course be @yg@ > 0; but if
@yg
@ < 0, the decrease
in the green electricity production would be less than the decrease in the black
electricity production.
Impacts of the ETS price
In the long run, rms can shift their production towards technologies with lower
emission density which means that @@pets < 0 rather than
@
@pets
= 0: Further we
believe that the price elasticity for CO2 emissions is inelastic, since the ETS price
has a relatively small e¤ect on the quantity of CO2 emissions. An inelastic price
elasticity means that pets
@
@pets
>  1. Hence the impacts of the ETS price in
the long run will be written,
@yb
@pets
=
(1  )2

 + pets
@
@pets

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
< 0; (17)
@yg
@pets
=
 (1  )

 + pets
@
@pets

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
< 0; (18)
@y
@pets
=
(1  )

 + pets
@
@pets

@p
@y   (1  )2 @
2cb
@y2b
  a2 @2cg@y2g
< 0: (19)
The sign of the equations (17), (18) and (19) will depend on the mutual rela-
tionship between  and pets
@
@pets
: The breakeven point, where the impacts of
the ETS price change sign, is where pets
@
@pets
=  1, meaning that the breakeven
point is where the price elasticity for CO2 emissions equals -1. Therefore, since
we assume that the demand for CO2 emissions is inelastic,12 we will have a neg-
ative impact of the ETS price on both types of electricity production and on the
total electricity production.13 Further we see that the impact is larger on the
12 pets

@
@pets
>  1
13However, if the price elasticity for CO2 emissions is elastic

pets

@
@pets
<  1

, we will
have a positive impact of the ETS price on both types of electricity production and on total
electricity production. We believe this to be highly unlikely.
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black electricity production compared to the green production.14 However, we
still have the obscure result for the impact on the green electricity production
(see the discussion in the short run and in the concluding section).
5 Visiting the Nordic Electricity Market
In order to shed some more light on the undetermined signs of the impacts of the
quota obligation on electricity production, we take a closer look at the available
data. We use historical time series for Sweden for the price of electricity and
TGCs and for the amount of electricity produced. The undetermined impacts
and the relationships we want to understand, are:
 the impacts of the quota obligation on the green electricity production
(both short and long run): 1p in relation to ptgc
 the impacts of the quota obligation on the total electricity production in
the short run:   (1  )b 1 b(b  1)Db 1p0;2 in relations to ptgc:
Impacts of the quota obligation on the green electricity production
We start with the impacts on the green electricity production, and as stated
above we need to know the relation between 1p and ptgc:We know that
@yg
@ > 0
if
 1p > ptgc; both for the short and long run. The price of electricity, p; is the
price before the TGCs, emission allowances and taxes, and can be interpreted
as the system price of electricity at Nord Pool, while ptgc is the price of the
green certicates. We study the historical time series for the prices 2004-2010
(Nord Pool Spot 2011; Svenska Kraftnät15 2011) and see that
 1p > ptgc for
every day during this period, with 0:1 < jj < 0:3:16 For the long run we have
jj > 0:3; and with jj < 2 we have that
 1p > ptgc also in the long run17 .
Therefore, based on the empirics from 20042010, we state that the impacts of
the quota obligation on the green electricity production are positive, both in
the short and long run.
Impacts of the quota obligation on the total electricity production,
short run
We use time series for 2008-2010 from Nord Pool Spot(2011) for the electricity
price and from Svenska Kraftnät (2011) for electricity production to determine
the size of D and the prices: We see that for 0:1 < jj < 0:3 together with
1:1 < b < 1:3, @y@ < 0; but if b exceeds 1:3 there is a shift in the sign and
14As long as  is smaller than 0.5.
15The Swedish national grid.
16With  = 0; 081 (2004),  = 0; 104 (2005),  = 0,126 (2006),  = 0; 151 (2007),  = 0; 163
(2008),  = 0; 17 (2009) and  = 0; 179 (2010). Actually p > ptgc for almost all dates, except
for a small number of days, (less than 25 days a year) where p < ptgc. However since
 1  > 
for these days still
 1 p > ptgc holds. Results are available on request.
17With the same  as above. Actually, the limit jj < 2 comes from the theoretical dis-
cussion. With the data from 2004-2010, jj can be larger and the inequality still holds. The
results are available on request.
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@y
@ > 0: This means that the impact of the quota obligation on total electricity
production is more sensitive to changes in b than to changes in  and in variables
set by the market, i.e. p, ptgc and D. We believe that 1:1 < b < 1:3 is a
reasonable estimate and therefore state that the impact of the quota obligation
on the total electricity production is negative. This means that increasing the
quota obligation decreases the total electricity production, and also that the
decrease in black electricity is larger than the increase in the green electricity
production.
6 Extending a market for TGCs
Now that we have studied a domestic TGC market, what happens if we extend
the market to two countries with a common market for electricity, emission al-
lowances and tradable green certicates? Since this market extension can be
seen as the upcoming Swedish-Norwegian market, the analysis is carried out
in this setting. In this market we assume the price of electricity and emission
allowances to be exogenous, since the two countries will be part of a larger elec-
tricity and emission allowance market18 . We study the impacts on the country
with an existing TGC system (Sweden) when another country (Norway) enters
the market. The analysis is divided into two scenarios and with the general
model as starting point. The two scenarios di¤er in what expected e¤ect the
international market has on the TGC price, which is highly uncertain.19 Sce-
nario I assumes that an international market pushes down the TGC price, while
scenario II assumes that an international market pushes up the TGC price. We
will discuss the short- and long-term e¤ects for each scenario, and the results
are summarized in Table 2 in Section 7.
The model in the short run
First, we recap the derivatives with the short-run assumptions,20
@yb
@ =
 y @p@y+(1 )ptgc
@p
@y (1 )2
@2cb
@y2
b
< 0; @yb@pets =
(1 )2
@p
@y (1 )2
@2cb
@y2
b
< 0;
@yg
@ =
1
 p (1 )y
@2cb
@y2
b
+ptgc
@p
@y (1 )2
@2cb
@y2
b
;
@yg
@pets
= (1 )
@p
@y (1 )2
@2cb
@y2
b
< 0;
@y
@ =
 (1 )b 1b(b 1)Db 1p(b 1)+ptgc
@p
@y (1 )2
@2cb
@y2
b
; @y@pets =
(1 )
@p
@y (1 )2
@2cb
@y2
b
< 0:
We see that regarding the impacts of the ETS price, nothing changes with the
TGC price. The impact of the ETS price on black, green and total electricity
18This will be the case in the Swedish-Norwegian market. The electricity price is set on
the Nordic market, which comprises Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Further, the
northern European market is linked to this market. The emission allowances are part of the
EU ETS, with allowances valid in 30 European countries.
19This will be exemplied below when presenting the scenarios.
20The short run assumptions are @
2cg
@y2g
= 0; @
@pets
= 0; cb = y
b with b  1:2 and y = Dp
with 0:1 < jj < 0:3:
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production is negative, so an increase in the ETS price decreases the production.
This is in line with the result above for the closed TGC market. The result
regarding the impacts of the quota obligation on the black electricity production
is the same as for the domestic TGC market and independent of the development
of TGC prices. For the other impacts of the quota obligation we need to divide
the analysis into two scenarios.
Scenario I, an extended market pushes down the TGC price This
scenario assumes that the opening of the TGC market pushes down the TGC
price compared to the price in Sweden prior to the common market. This is
a reasonable scenario, since Norway may have a surplus of TGCs as a result
of its hydropower. Thus, ptgc decreases compared to the closed market in the
previous section. The denominator is still the same and negative, and hence
we will study the numerator. For the production of green electricity, the only
positive part of the numerator, ptgc, is smaller than before. However, the
sign of the impact on the green electricity production in the domestic market is
undetermined, without using the assumption
 1p > ptgc: When studying the
historical time series, we saw that the impact on the green electricity production
is positive since we observed that
 1p > ptgc: Based on this, a smaller ptgc
also leads to a positive impact on the green electricity production, conditional
on that p is the same. An indirect e¤ect of changes in ptgc is of course also
possible, leading to a decrease in the price of electricity. Yet, this potential is
much smaller than the direct e¤ect on the TGC price.21
For the impact on the total production, the discussion is similar to the one
above. The only positive part of the numerator, ptgc, is smaller than before
and if there are no changes to the negative term, then the impact will still be
positive. However, as before, there might be indirect e¤ects on the price of
electricity, p, and on D22 that will change the size of the negative part of the
impacts on the total electricity production. We study the included terms in the
numerator and test the sensitivity of the impacts of the included parameters23
on the total electricity production. We conclude that the impact on the total
electricity production is negative also in this case. Let us now move on to
scenario II.
Scenario II, an extended market pushes up the TGC price This e¤ect
may be due to a shortage of TGCs in Norway, maybe a resulting from a too
sparse allocation of TGCs. Therefore, ptgc increases compared to the closed
market and again we will discuss the numerator of the terms. For the impact
on the green and total electricity production, the only positive term, ptgc; has
increased and there may also be changes in the negative terms due to indirect
e¤ects on p: Thus, we are not able to determine the sign of the impacts on the
green or the total electricity production.
21This depends on how sensitive the price of electricity is to changes in the TGC price. In
the Swedish-Norwegian case this e¤ect will be small since the prices of both electricity and
ETS are set on a bigger market.
22Since D = y
p
, indirect e¤ects in production will change the size of D:
23D, b,  and :
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The model in the long run
We start with the derivatives with the long-run assumptions,24
@yb
@ =
y
@2cg
@y2g
  1 p+(1 )ptgc
@p
@y a2
@2cg
@y2g
< 0; @yb@pets =
(1 )2(+pets @@pets )
@p
@y a2
@2cg
@y2g
< 0;
@yg
@ =
1
 p+ptgc
@p
@y 2
@2cg
@y2g
;
@yg
@pets
=
(1 )(+pets @@pets )
@p
@y a2
@2cg
@y2g
< 0;
@y
@ =
y
@2cg
@y2g
+ptgc
@p
@y 2
@2cg
@y2g
; @y@pets =
(1 )(+pets @@pets )
@p
@y a2
@2cg
@y2g
< 0:
And as for the short-run analysis, we see that all results for the impacts of the
ETS price as well as the impact of the quota obligation on the black electricity
are consistent with those for the domestic TGC market.25 For the impacts of
the quota obligation on the green and total electricity production, we need the
two scenario analyses.
Scenario I, an extended market pushes down the TGC price We will
now revisit scenario I, where ptgc decreases compared to the closed market in the
previous section. With a decrease in ptgc; we see that, regarding the impacts
on the green electricity production, the positive term, ptgc, decreases. The
negative part, 1p; may also be indirectly a¤ected by changes in ptgc; giving a
decrease in the price of electricity. However, this e¤ect is much smaller than
the direct e¤ect on the TGC price. Based on the ndings in Section 5, we
have a positive impact on the green electricity production, meaning that the
production of green electricity increases when the quota obligation increases.
When it comes to the impact on the total electricity production, we see that
the terms in the numerator are still positive, yet the magnitude of ptgc has
increased. This means that the impact on the total electricity production is
still negative, and hence that the total production of electricity will decrease
when the quota obligation increases. Summarizing the results, we see that if
the international market pushes down the TGC prices, the impacts on electricity
production are the same as in the domestic TGC market case. An increase of
the quota obligation increases the production of green electricity and decreases
the black electricity production and the total electricity production. Let us now
move on to scenario II.
Scenario II, an extended market pushes up the TGC price We will
now revisit scenario II, where extending the market for TGC pushes up the
price of TGCs, as discussed above. For the total production, we see that the
24The long run assumptions are @
2cb
@y2g
= 0; @
@pets
< 0 and y = Dp with 0:3 < jj < 2:
25For the impacts of the ETS price this is conditional on the assumption of inelastic demand
for CO2 emissions, and we see no reason for this to change when extending the market for
TGCs.
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impact is still negative. When it comes to the impact on the green electricity,
we see that we may have a shift here. Before, we had that the impact was
positive since 1p > ptgc; but now as ptgc is increasing we see that depending
on the magnitude of ptgc, maybe the impact will shift sign and become negative.
The price of the electricity production may also be a¤ected as an indirect e¤ect
of the price changes of the TGCs. According to this, the sign of the impact
on the green electricity production will be ambiguous, and will depend on the
interrelation between ptgc and 1p:
7 Results and discussion
Table 2 summarizes the results from the above sections. We can see that con-
trary to many other studies, we are able to determine the signs of most of
the derivatives. The signs are persistent for the di¤erent time horizons and
for the di¤erent market settings, which is promising. The underlying assump-
tions should however be kept in mind when reading the table. The parentheses
indicate that the result is based on assumptions using empirical data.
Table 2: Summary of the results.
General Domestic Trade in TGC
model TGC market scenario I scenario II
short long short long short long
@yb
@              
@yg
@ ? (+) (+) (+) (+) ? ?
@y
@ ? ( )   ( )   ?  
@yb
@pets
?            
@yg
@pets
?            
@y
@pets
?            
For the domestic market, we have very clear results that are consistent over
time. For the impacts of changes in the quota obligation, we see that the total
production decreases even though the production using renewable resources in-
creases. This means that the decrease in black electricity production is larger
than the increase in green electricity production. For the impacts of changes
in the ETS price on electricity production, we see that both types of electricity
production and the total electricity production will decrease. Also, the largest
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decrease occurs in the production of black electricity. As discussed before, the
decrease in the production of green electricity is unexpected and shows the dan-
ger of combining policy instruments. When it comes to the market with trade,
we observe some question marks in Table 2. Even though these question marks
are still worrying (and dissatisfying), they show up for less important results,
since we believe that long-run e¤ects are more important than short-run e¤ects.
Comparing our results with the results from previous research we see that they
are consistent, with the common feature of fewer clear results. The reason that
we are able to determine the signs of more impacts, we believe is due to the
assumptions made and the division of the analysis into a short and a long run.
Hence, we include more assumptions than some other studies, without losing
accuracy in the analysis. For instance, Amundsen and Nese (2009) are not able
to determine a distinctive impact of the quota obligation on green electricity
production or total production. When it comes to the market with trade, it is
hard to compare our results with Amundsen and Nese (2009) since the ways
the problem is tackled di¤ers. Also Fisher (2009) studies the impacts of the
quota obligation and gets similar results for black electricity, but has problems
with the impacts for green electricity. Comparing our result with Amundsen
and Mortensen (2001), that also have a division into short and long run, show
some consistency but the comparison is not straightforward since the underlying
assumptions di¤er. Worth noting is that for the impacts of changes in the ETS
price, the price elasticity for CO2 emissions is driving the results. For the
impacts of the quota obligation, the driving force depends on the production
of interest. For the total production in the short run it is b (the exponent
in the cost function) while for the green electricity the result depends on the
relationship between the prices of electricity and TGC. We believe that there
are still questions that need more research within this area, both theoretical
and empirical. For instance, studies of the outcome of the Swedish-Norwegian
market and further extensions of the TGC market are interesting areas.
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